THE QUALITY AND EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE UNCOVERED WAS NOT UNIVERSALLY APPLIED.
(TAKEN FROM THE TEXT.)
In addition to targeting individuals involved in the Clinton Campaign, GRU officers also targeted individuals and entities involved in the administration of the elections. Victims included U.S. state and local entities, such as state boards of elections (SBOEs), secretaries of state, and county governments, as well as individuals who worked for those entities. 186 The GRU also targeted private technology firms responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related software and hardware, such as voter registration software and electronic polling stations.187 The GRU continued to target these victims through the elections in November 2016.
While the investigation identified evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and entities, the Office did not investigate further. The Office did not, for instance, obtain or examine servers or other relevant items belonging to these victims. The Office understands that the FBI, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the states have separately investigated that activity.
AND.
(TAKEN FROM THE TEXT)
Unit 74455 also sent spearphishing emails to public officials involved in election administration and personnel at companies involved in voting technology. In August 2016, GRU officers targeted employees of **** ,a voting technology company that developed software used by numerous U.S. counties to manage voter rolls, and installed malware on the company network. Similarly, in November 2016, the GRU sent spearphishing emails to over 120 email accounts used by Florida county officials responsible for administering the 2016 U.S. election. 191 The spearphishing emails contained an attached Word document coded with malicious software (commonly referred to as a Trojan) that permitted the GRU to access the infected computer.192 The FBI was separately responsible for this investigation. We understand the FBI believes that this operation enabled the GRU to gain access to the network of at least one Florida county government.
The Office did not independently verify that belief and, as explained above, did not undertake the investigative steps that would have been necessary to do so.
(TAKEN FROM THE TEXT.)
In addition to targeting individuals involved in the Clinton Campaign, GRU officers also targeted individuals and entities involved in the administration of the elections. Victims included U.S. state and local entities, such as state boards of elections (SBOEs), secretaries of state, and county governments, as well as individuals who worked for those entities. 186 The GRU also targeted private technology firms responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related software and hardware, such as voter registration software and electronic polling stations.187 The GRU continued to target these victims through the elections in November 2016.
While the investigation identified evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and entities, the Office did not investigate further. The Office did not, for instance, obtain or examine servers or other relevant items belonging to these victims. The Office understands that the FBI, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the states have separately investigated that activity.
AND.
(TAKEN FROM THE TEXT)
Unit 74455 also sent spearphishing emails to public officials involved in election administration and personnel at companies involved in voting technology. In August 2016, GRU officers targeted employees of **** ,a voting technology company that developed software used by numerous U.S. counties to manage voter rolls, and installed malware on the company network. Similarly, in November 2016, the GRU sent spearphishing emails to over 120 email accounts used by Florida county officials responsible for administering the 2016 U.S. election. 191 The spearphishing emails contained an attached Word document coded with malicious software (commonly referred to as a Trojan) that permitted the GRU to access the infected computer.192 The FBI was separately responsible for this investigation. We understand the FBI believes that this operation enabled the GRU to gain access to the network of at least one Florida county government.
The Office did not independently verify that belief and, as explained above, did not undertake the investigative steps that would have been necessary to do so.
WHAT DO THESE PASSAGES TELL US?
THAT WHEN IT CAME DOWN TO JUDGING THE QUALITY OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA PORTION OF THE INVESTIGATION, THE MUELLER REPORT GATHERED THE INFORMATION, AND EVALUATED ITS WORTH IN DRAWING CONCLUSIONS, AND THE DECISION TO FILE CRIMINAL CHARGES.
HOWEVER, WHEN THE EVIDENCE WAS GATHERED UNDER THE CATEGORY OF, "Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections." THE FOLLOWING WAS THE PROCEDURE:
WHAT FOLLOWS BELOW ARE QUOTES TAKEN FROM THE TEXT.
While the investigation identified evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and entities, the Office did not investigate further... The Office understands that the FBI, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the states have separately investigated that activity.
ALSO THIS:
The Office did not independently verify that belief and, as explained above, did not undertake the investigative steps that would have been necessary to do so.
SO, TO EVALUATE THE QUALITY OF THE EVIDENCE IN THESE CASES, WE SHOULD BE TURNING TO THE ABOVE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, AND NOT THE REPORT ITSELF?
MR. MUELLER, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE ABOVE ANALYSIS IS ACCURATE?
